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Freedom and/or Separation: The
Constitutional Dilemma of the First
Amendmentt
Leo Pfeffer*
I. THE ORIGINS OF CONSTITUTIONAL PROTECTION
It is not the purpose of this Article to explore in detail the
history that culminated in the first amendment's mandate
against laws respecting an establishment of religion or prohib-
iting its free exercise. It is sufficient to note that the mandate
resulted from a combination of practical considerations and
ideological influences. Among the practical considerations
were the adoption by Parliament of the Act of Toleration of
1689, which was generally, though not universally, assumed to
apply to the colonies; the mutiplicity of Protestant sects within
the colonies; the relatively substantial number of unchurched
persons; the rise of commerce; and the exigencies of the Revo-
lutionary War, which impelled the colonial governments to
avoid alienating Catholics within the colonies and in Canada.
The ideological influences included the religious tradition of
Roger Williams and William Penn; the political and social
thought of John Locke and other protagonists of the Social
Contract; the Great Awakening of the eighteenth century, with
its individualization of religion; and the spread of rationalism
and deism during the last quarter of the eighteenth century.'
The struggle toward free exercise was slow, painful, and
uneven. Maryland's "Act concerning Religion," adopted in 1649,
is generally referred to as the Toleration Act because it allowed
some degree of toleration of all Christian denominations, in-
t This Article is a revision of a paper presented at a symposium entitled
"From Religious Toleration to Religious Freedom: A Symposium," sponsored
by the Department of Religion, Columbia University, and held at Newport,
Rhode Island, on May 24-26, 1978.
* Professor of Constitutional Law, Long Island University; Special Coun-
sel, American Jewish Congress.
1. For a more thorough analysis of the historical and ideological influ-
ences on the first amendment, see L. PFEFFER, CHURCH, STATE, AND FREEDOM
71-127 (rev. ed. 1967) (chs. 3-4); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, CHURCH AND STATE IN
THE UNITED STATES 3-103 (rev. ed. 1964).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cluding Catholics.2 The Act nevertheless imposed the penalty
of death and confiscation or forfeiture of estate upon all who
shall from henceforth blaspheme God,... or shall deny our Saviour
Jesus Christ to bee the sonne of God, or shall deny the holy Trinity the
father sonne and holy Ghost, or the Godhead of any of the said Three
persons of the Trinity or the Unity of the Godhead.3
Even more tortuous than the development of free exercise
was the progress of disestablishment and the adoption of the
principle later called the separation of church and state. The
relationship of religion to government in the original thirteen
states at the time of the adoption of the Constitution can be
summarized as follows:
Two ... , Virginia and Rhode Island, conceded full freedom;
One, New York, gave full freedom except for requiring naturalized
citizens to abjure foreign allegiance and subjection in all matters eccle-
siastical as well as civil;
Six, New Hampshire, Connecticut, New Jersey, Georgia, North and
South Carolina, adhered to religious establishments;
Two, Delaware and Maryland, demanded Christianity;
Four, Pennsylvania, Delaware, North and South Carolina, required
assent to the divine inspiration of the Bible;
Two, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, imposed a belief in heaven
and hell;
Three, New York, Delaware, and South Carolina, excluded minis-
ters from civil office;
Four, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, and Georgia, excluded
ministers from the legislature;
Two, Pennsylvania and South Carolina, emphasized belief in one
eternal God,
One, Delaware, required assent to the doctrine of the Trinity;
2. Be it therefore [enacted] that noe person or p[er]sons whatsoever
within this Province .... professing to believe in Jesus Christ, shall
from henceforth be [in any way] troubled, Molested or dis-
countenanced for or in respect of his or her religion nor in the free ex-
ercise thereof within this Province ... nor [in] any way compelled to
the beliefe or exercise of any other Religion against his or her con-
sent ....
An Act concerning Religion (Apr. 21, 1649), reprinted in 1 ARCHIVES OF MARY-
LAND: PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND 244,
246 (W. Browne ed. 1883). See R. BuTrs, THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN RELIGION
AND EDUCATION 25 (1950); S. COBB, THE RISE OF RELIGIOUS LIBERTY IN AMERICA:
A HISTORY 376-77 (1970); A. STOKES & L. PFEFFER, supra note 1, at 11-12; W.
SWEET, RELIGION IN COLONIAL AMERICA 33 (1965).
3. An Act concerning Religion (Apr. 21, 1649), reprinted in 1 ARCHIVES OF
MARYLAND: PROCEEDINGS AND ACTS OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF MARYLAND
244 (W. Browne ed. 1883). In 1654, Maryland passed an act "repealing the toler-
ation of 1649 [declaring] that, 'None who professes the exercise of the ... Ro-
man Catholic Religion, can be protected in this Province."' S. COBB, .supra
note 2, at 379.
The death penalty for heresy was not limited to Maryland; yet even in
Maryland there is no record of it having ever been imposed. It appears that
only in Massachusetts were persons executed for religious unorthodoxy, specif-
ically for being Quakers. W. SWEET, supra note 2, at 146-47.
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Five, New Hampshire, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Maryland, and
South Carolina, insisted on Protestantismn;
One, South Carolina, still referred to religious "toleration.',
4
In the light of this situation, it is not surprising that the
comparatively short document in which we declared our inde-
pendence from England, written by the deist Thomas Jefferson,
contains four references to the Deity.5 What is surprising, how-
ever, is that the lengthier text of the Constitution, written a
mere eleven years later, contains no invocation of or reference
to the Deity or to religion except the negative one in the last
operative article, which forbids religious tests for government
office.6 Under that provision, persons belonging to a noncon-
formist religion as well as avowed atheists are eligible for elec-
tion to the presidency.
By 1787 it had become the general assumption that,
whatever might be the situation in the individual states, the na-
tional government was to have no jurisdiction in the arena of
religion.7 The commitment to this principle was so widespread
that the American people were not content with an implicit ex-
clusion but insisted that the Constitution, through amendment,
explicitly bar laws respecting an establishment of religion or
prohibiting its free exercise.8
4. L. PFEFFER, supra note 1, at 118 (citing S. COBB, supra note 2, at 507).
5. When in the Course of human Events,... it becomes necessary
* * to assume among the Powers of the earth, the separate and equal
station to which the Laws of... Nature's God entitle them, . . . a de-
cent respect to the opinions of mankind requires that they should de-
clare the causes which impel them to the separation.
We hold these truths to be self-evident, that all Men are created
equal, that they are endowed by their Creator with certain inalienable
Rights ....
We, therefore, the Representatives of the United States of America,
... appealing to the Supreme Judge of the world... , with a firm reli-
ance on the Protection of Divine Providence,... mutually pledge to
each other our Lives, our Fortunes and our sacred Honor.
The Declaration of Independence, July 4, 1776, in 1 DOcuMENTs OF AMERICAN
HIsTORY, Doc. No. 66, at 100-02 (9th ed. H. Commager 1973) (quoting 1 FEDERAL
AND STATE CONSTrrUTIONS 3 (F. Thorpe ed. 1906)).
6. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 3.
7. See L. PFEFFER, supra note 1, at 119-21.
8. The Convention was apparently willing to outlaw religious discrim-
ination among federal office holders but not at this stage to prohibit re-
ligious establishments as a protection for the equal rights of
conscience. But the people of several of the states were not satisfied
with this partial achievement. New York, Virginia, and New Hamp-
shire ratified the Constitution but proposed amendments for a bill of
rights, specifically including religious freedom and disestablishment.
North Carolina and Rhode Island would not ratify until a bill of rights, "
including religion, was adopted. The "public clamor" for a more thor-
ough-going separation of church and state was so great that Madison
and others could persuade several states to adopt the Constitution as
1980]
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II. THE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN SEPARATION AND
FREEDOM
It is the premise of this Article that the religion clauses of
the first amendment encompass a unitary guaranty of separa-
tion and freedom. Notwithstanding instances of apparent con-
flict, separation guarantees freedom and freedom requires
separation. 9 The draftsmen of the amendment regarded free-
dom of religion and establishment as incompatible. American
constitutional history and tradition do not justify an apportion-
ment of values between disestablishment and freedom. The
struggle for religious liberty and for disestablishment were por-
tions of a single evolutionary process that culminated in the
first amendment. In the words of Justice Rutledge,
"'fe]stablishment' and 'free exercise' were correlative and co-
extensive ideas, representing only different facets of the single
great and fundamental freedom."10
The history that leads up to the adoption of the first
amendment religion clauses amply supports Justice Rutledge's
conclusion. Roger Williams, for example, opposed an "enforced
uniformity of religion" (freedom concept) because it "con-
founds the Civil and Religious" (separation concept)."
Madison opposed a bill establishing a provision for teachers of
the Christian religion (separation concept) because it violated
the "fundamental and undeniable truth, 'that Religion ... can
be directed only by reason and conviction, not by force or vio-
lence"' (freedom concept).12 Virginia's "Act for establishing
Religious Freedom" was adopted in 1786 because of "the impi-
framed at the Convention only after promising to work for the addition
of amendments that would genuinely protect civil liberties in a specific
bill of rights in which freedom and equality of religious conscience
played a prominent and fundamental part.
R. BuTrrs, supra note 2, at 72.
9. [Separation and freedom] are not separate concepts or principles
but really two sides of a single coin. The fathers of the First Amend-
ment were convinced that the free exercise of religion and the separa-
tion of church and state were two ways of saying the same thing that
separation guaranteed freedom and freedom required separation.
Pfeffer, The Case for Separation, in RELIGION IN AMERICA 52, 60 (J. Cogley ed.
1958).
10. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 40 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissent-
ing). Although Justice Rutledge's statement was made in a dissenting opinion,
there was no disagreement with this point in the majority opinion. See notes
18-19 infra and accompanying text.
11. Williams, The Bloudy Tenent of Persecution for cause of Conscience,
Discussed, in a Conference betweene Truth and Peace (1644), reprinted in 3
PUBLICATIONS OF THE NARRAGANSETT CLUB 3-4 (S. Caldwell ed. 1867).
12. Madison, Memorial and Remonstrance Against Religious Assessments
(1785) (quoting Declaration of Rights, art. 16), reprinted in Everson v. Board of
[Vol. 64:561
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ous presumption of legislators and rulers" who had "estab-
lished and maintained false religions" (separation concept)13
In Common Sense, Thomas Paine noted the unity of the du-
alism: "As to religion, I hold it to be the indispensible duty of
government to protect all conscientious professors thereof, and
I know of no other business which government hath to do
therewith.1 4 The proposed versions of the first amendment,
submitted to the states and considered by Congress before it
adopted the final form, combined both aspects of the dual pro-
hibition without any indication that one was superior and the
other subordinate. The first version of the amendment submit-
ted by James Madison and considered by Congress stated,
"The civil rights of none shall be abridged on account of reli-
gious belief, nor shall any national religion be established, nor
shall the full and equal rights of conscience in any manner be
infringed."' 5 President Jefferson refused to proclaim days of
fasting and prayer because of "the provision that no law shall
be made respecting the establishment or free exercise of reli-
gion. ' 16
In an 1878 case involving a freedom clause attack on an an-
tibigamy statute, the Supreme Court explicity stated that the
first amendment was intended to erect "a wall of separation be-
tween church and State."' 7 Finally, the fact that all fifty states
guarantee religious freedom and not one allows an establish-
ment of religion would appear to be convincing evidence that in
the American tradition, the concepts of free exercise and
nonestablishment are correlative and unitary.
In Everson v. Board of Education,18 Justice Black, speaking
for the majority of the Court, expressed the meaning of the es-
tablishment clause:
The "establishment of religion" clause of the First Amendment means
at least this: Neither a state nor the Federal Government can set up a
Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 63, 64 (1947) (appendix to dissenting opinion by Justice Rut-
ledge).
13. Virginia Statute of Religious Liberty, January 16, 1786, in 1 DOCUMENTS
OF AMERICAN HISTORY, supra note 5, Doc. No. 80, at 125 (citing 12 Statutes at
Large of Virginia 84 (W. Hening ed.)).
14. A. STOKES, 1 CHURCH AND STATE IN THE UNITED STATES 318-19 (1950)
(quoting T. PAINE, COMMON SENSE (1776)).
15. 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 434 (Gales & Seaton eds. 1789).
16. 11 JEFFERSON'S WRITNGS 428-30 (Monticello ed. 1905).
17. Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878).
18. 330 U.S. 1 (1947). In this case, a taxpayer challenged a New Jersey stat-
ute and a local board of education resolution that authorized reimbursement of
transportation expenses to parents of children attending sectarian schools.
Over a strong dissent, a majority of the Supreme Court held that the reim-
bursement plan did not violate the first amendment. Id. at 18.
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church. Neither can pass laws which aid one religion, aid all religions,
or prefer one religion over another. Neither can force nor influence a
person to go to or to remain away from church against his will or force
him to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion. No person can be
punished for entertaining or professing religious beliefs or disbeliefs,
for church attendance or non-attendance. No tax in any amount, large
or small, can be levied to support any religious activities or institutions,
whatever they may be called, or whatever form they may adopt to
teach or practice religion. Neither a state nor the Federal Government
can, openly or secretly, participate in the affairs of any religious organi-
zations or groups and vice versa. In the words of Jefferson, the clause
against establishment of religion by law was intended to erect "a waln
of separation between church and State."
1 9
The barrier against laws setting up a church, preferring one
religion over another, or aiding religion is generally considered
to be an aspect of the antiestablishment provision; the prohibi-
tion against forcing a person to attend or remain away from
church or to profess a belief or disbelief in any religion would
seem to fall within the parameters of the free exercise clause.
Nevertheless, the Court held that laws punishing disbelief or
failure to attend church are forbidden by the establishment
clause no less than by the free exercise clause.20
In numerous decisions during the past decade, the Court
has phrased the meaning of the establishment clause in some-
what different language. The Court has formulated a three-part
test to determine whether a law will "pass muster under the
Establishment Clause":2 1 first, the statute "must reflect a
clearly secular legislative purpose";22 second, it "must have a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion";23
third, the statute "must avoid excessive government entangle-
ment with religion. '24 Advancing religion obviously constitutes
establishment, but inhibiting religion means prohibiting its free
exercise, and that too, the Court has held, constitutes a viola-
tion of the establishment clause.25
19. Id. at 15-16 (quoting Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145, 164 (1878)).
20. See Zorach v. Clauson, 343 U.S. 306 (1952), which stated, "The govern-
ment must be neutral when it comes to competition between sects. It may not
thrust any sect on any person. It may not make a religious observance compul-
sory. It may not coerce anyone to attend church, to observe a religious holiday,
or to take religious instruction." Id. at 314.
21. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
773 (1973).
22. Id. (citing Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97 (1968)).
23. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
773 (1973) (citing Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Mc-
Gowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420 (1961)).
24. Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756,
773 (1973) (citing Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664, 668 (1970)).
25. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15 (1947).
[Vol. 64:561
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This view of the unity of the religion clauses is not shared
by all constitutional lawyers and historians. The legion who
disagree include such notable scholars as Erwin Griswold, for-
merly Dean of Harvard Law School and later Solicitor General
of the United States, 26 Edward Corwin,2 7 Paul Kauper,28 and
Wilbur Katz.29 Typical of their views is that expressed by Wil-
bur Katz:
Except for occasional flights of rhetoric, no one contends either that ab-
solute separation of church and state is required by the first amend-
ment or that such a rule would be desirable. Nor does the concept of
separation provide its own principle of limitation. In determining the
limits of constitutional separation, it is the concept of religious freedom
which provides the criterion. The principle of church-state separation
is an instrumental principle. Separation ordinarily promotes religious
freedom; it is defensible so long as it does so, and only so long.
3 0
26. See Griswold, Absolute is in the Dark-A Discussion of the Approach of
the Supreme Court to the Constitutional Questions, 8 UTAH L REv. 167, 169-73
(1963).
27. See E. CORWIN, A CONSTITUTION OF POWERS IN A SECULAR STATE 98-118
(1951).
28. See Kauper, Church and State: Cooperative Separatism, 60 MICH. L.
REv. 1, 7-18 (1961); Kauper, Church, State, and Freedom: A Review, 52 MICH. L.
REV. 829 (1954).
29. See Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, in REUGION IN AMERICA 95 (J.
Cogley ed. 1958); Katz, Freedom of Religion and State Neutrality, 20 U. CHI. L.
REv. 426 (1953).
30. Katz, The Case for Religious Liberty, supra note 29, at 97. An interest-
ing variation of this approach is presented by Note, Toward a Constitutional
Definition of Religion, 91 HARv. L. REV. 1056 (1978). The Note suggests that the
first amendment should be interpreted as securing two related but separable
mandates: one against laws respecting an establishment of religion and the
other against laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion. The author suggests
that the first should be construed narrowly, but the second should be given a
broad or expansive interpretation to ensure "strict judicial scrutiny wherever
there is a departure from or erosion in the individual's right in matters of ulti-
mate concern." Id. at 1082-83.
There are a number of difficulties with this approach. For example, this
differentiation of values is not easily reconcilable with their relative positions
in the amendment; logic would seem to require a reverse order of presentation,
one that would place the free exercise clause before, not after the establish-
ment clause. Second, the wording of the first amendment also indicates a re-
verse order of protection from that proposed in the Note. The amendment
forbids only laws prohibiting the free exercise of religion, whereas its prohibi-
tion under the establishment clause encompasses not only laws that establish
religion but also those that merely respect an establishment of religion.
Most important, however, is the fact that the first amendment does not
guarantee "the free exercise of religion"; it guarantees "the free exercise
thereof." It is difficult to see how "thereof" can be construed so as to arrive at a
definition differing from that to which it refers. As stated in Justice Rutledge's
dissenting opinion in Everson,
"Religion" appears only once in the Amendment. But the word
governs two prohibitions and governs them alike. It does not have two
meanings, one narrow to forbid "an establishment" and another, much
broader, for securing "the free exercise thereof." 'Thereof" brings
down "religion" with its entire and exact content, no more and no less,
1980]
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These scholars are apparently not alone in discovering a di-
chotomy in the religion clauses. The majority of the current
Supreme Court, unlike its predecessors, appears to find such a
dichotomy in the first amendment. In Wisconsin v. Yoder,3 1
Chief Justice Burger wrote for the majority:
The Court must not ignore the danger that an exception from a
general obligation of citizenship on religious grounds may run afoul of
the Establishment Clause, but that danger cannot be allowed to pre-
vent any exception no matter how vital it may be to the protection of
values promoted by the right of free exercise.3 2
The same apparent conflict and preference was noted by Jus-
tice Brennan in his concurring opinion in Abington School Dis-
trict v. Schempp:33
There are certain practices, conceivably violative of the Establishment
Clause, the striking down of which might seriously interfere with cer-
tain religious liberties also protected by the First Amendment. Provi-
sions for churches and chaplains at military establishments for those
in the armed services may afford one such example. The like provision
by state and federal governments for chaplains in penal institutions
may afford another example. It is argued that such provisions may be
assumed to contravene the Establishment Clause, yet be sustained on
constitutional grounds as necessary to secure to the members of the
Armed Forces and prisoners those rights of worship guaranteed under
the Free Exercise Clause. Since government has deprived such per-
sons of the opportunity to practice their faith at places of their choice,
the argument runs, government may, in order to avoid infringing the
free exercise guarantees, provide substitutes where it requires such
persons to be....
The State must be steadfastly neutral in all matters of faith, and
neither favor nor inhibit religion .... On the other hand, hostility, not
neutrality, would characterize the refusal to provide chaplains and
places of worship for prisoners and soldiers cut off by the State from
all civilian opportunities for public communion, the withholding of
draft exemptions for ministers and conscientious objectors, or the de-
nial of the temporary use of an empty public building to a congregation
whose place of worship has been destroyed by fire or flood.
3 4
Those who argue for a dualistic rather than a unitary inter-
pretation of the first amendment are faced with the task of de-
termining which clause is superior in disposing of a situation
from the first into the second guaranty, so that Congress and now the
states are as broadly restricted concerning the one as they are regard-
ing the other.
Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 32 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting).
The bifurcated definition advocated in the Note mandates a preferential or-
der of values favoring those encompassed in the free exercise clause. The his-
tory underlying the first amendment, however, does not support this definition.
See text accompanying notes 11-16 supra.
31. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
32. Id. at 220-21. For further discussion of this case, see text accompanying
notes 37-38, 58-59, 96-97 infra.
33. 374 U.S. 203 (1963).
34. Id. at 296-99 (Brennan, J., concurring).
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where separation conflicts with freedom. Generally, their solu-
tion has been to allocate superiority to free exercise, a judg-
ment that would probably receive the approval of all
Americans, including members of the Supreme Court, except
perhaps those who deem religion to be an enemy of the people.
Nothing in the text of the first amendment, however, supports
such an allocation of supposedly competing constitutional val-
ues. The amendment does not say, although it could easily
have done so, that Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion except when it conflicts with the free
exercise thereof. Nothing in the text of the amendment sup-
ports the view of John Courtney Murray, a view shared by
many others, that "separation of church and state, . . . put on
its proper grounds ... in its true relation to the free exercise of
religion [is] instrumental to freedom [and is] therefore ... a
relative, not an absolute ... right."35
It must be noted, however, that history reveals concerns
other than or in addition to the protection of the free exercise
of religion that impelled a prohibition of laws respecting an es-
tablishment of religion. James Madison, a principal author of
the first amendment, had argued only a few years prior to the
adoption of the Bill of Rights that religion, and not merely re-
straint on religion, was exempt from the authority of society
and could not be subject to the authority of legislative bodies;
he asserted that the state was not a competent judge of reli-
gious truth and had no authority to employ religion as even a
willing engine of civil policy.36 Furthermore, nothing in
Madison's other writings supports a theory of dualism or the
assertion that the purpose of the amendment was to protect
free exercise, and that the prohibition of establishment was no
more than a dispensable means to achieve that end.
The Supreme Court has not yet been faced with the need
to definitively adjudicate conflicts between free exercise and
establishment. In cases in which it appeared that the Court
would be forced to make a choice, it has succeeded in finding a
way to avoid having to do so. Nevertheless, in Wisconsin v.
Yoder,37 the Court indicated that if it had to make a choice,
free exercise would prevail over establishment.38 Yoder, how-
35. Murray, Law or Prepossessions?, 14 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 23, 32
(1949).
36. See Madison, supra note 12, reprinted in Everson v. Board of Educ., 330
U.S. 1, 63 (1974) (appendix to Justice Rutledge's dissenting opinion).
37. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
38. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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ever, was not the last word the Court has spoken on the ques-
tion. In Committee for Public Education and Religious Liberty
v. Nyquist,39 the Court held unconstitutional a law providing
tuition grants for students attending church schools:
Finally, the State argues that its program of tuition grants should
survive scrutiny because it is designed to promote the free exercise of
religion. The State notes that only "low-income parents" are aided by
this law, and without state assistance their right to have their children
educated in a religious environment "is diminished or even denied." It
is true, of course, that this Court has long recognized and maintained
the right to choose nonpublic over public education .... It is also true
that a state law interfering with a parent's right to have his child edu-
cated in a sectarian school would run afoul of the Free Exercise
Clause. But this Court repeatedly has recognized that tension inevita-
bly exists between the Free Exercise and the Establishment
Clauses, . . . and that it may often not be possible to promote the for-
mer without offending the latter. As a result of this tension, our cases
require the State to maintain an attitude of "neutrality," neither "ad-
vancing" nor "inhibiting" religion. In its attempt to enhance the oppor-
tunities of the poor to choose between public and nonpublic education,
the State has taken a step which can only be regarded as one "advanc-
ing" religion. However great our sympathy ... for the burdens exper-
ienced by those who must pay public school taxes at the same time
that they support other schools because of the constraints of "con-
science and discipline," . . . and ... notwithstanding the "high social
importance" of the State's purposes, neither may justify an eroding of
the limitations of the Establishment Clause now firmly emplanted.4 0
Here, too, the Court's stated preference is only dictum,
since the Court has never held, nor is it likely to hold, that a
state's denial of tuition grants impinges upon the free exercise
of religion. Nevertheless, in accepting the premise that such an
impingement exists, the opinion, reasonably read, surprisingly
indicates a choice favoring not the free exercise clause but
rather the establishment clause.
The Nyquist case is one instance in which the Court was
faced with an apparent, yet not unavoidable, need to choose be-
tween the two first amendment mandates. The balance of this
Article will consider in more detail other cases in which the
Court was faced with the opportunity, though in no case the
unavoidable necessity, of making such a choice.
III. ARENAS OF CONFLICT
A. TAX EXEMPnON
In Walz v. Tax Commission,41 the Court was called upon to
39. 413 U.S. 756 (1973).
40. Id. at 788-89 (footnotes and citations omitted).
41. 397 U.S. 664 (1970).
[Vol. 64:561
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determine the constitutionality of exempting church properties
from real estate taxation. The plaintiff claimed that exemption
had both the purpose and effect of aiding religion, and thereby
violated the establishment clause. With only Justice Douglas
dissenting, the Court upheld the law on the ground that a ma-
jor purpose of the establishment clause was to avoid excessive
entanglement between church and state, and that exemption
rather than taxation of church properties more effectively
served that purpose.42 In a concurring opinion, Justice Bren-
nan recognized that James Madison, after his retirement from
the Presidency, had argued that tax exemption for houses of
worship was violative of the establishment clause.43 Neverthe-
less, the Court noted, both Congress and the states have histor-
ically exempted church properties from taxation, and all fifty
states do so today-facts strongly indicating the constitutional-
ity of tax exemption.44
The amicus curiae brief submitted by the National Council
of Churches of Christ in the Walz case argued that the first
amendment not only permits tax exemption but, in fact, man-
dates it: "The Free Exercise Clause in the First Amendment
forbids taxation by the Federal or State governments of houses
of worship or of other religious property used exclusively for
religious purposes and owned by corporations organized exclu-
sively for religious purposes. '45 The Synagogue Council of
America endorsed the claim:
[P]roperty used for religious purposes, including the house of worship,
the religious sanctuary, and all that is contained therein are so inti-
mately connected with religious exercise that to levy a direct tax upon
the value of such property would constitute a tax on the exercise of re-
42. Id. at 674.
43. Id. at 684 n.5 (Brennan, J., concurring) (citing Fleet, Madison's "De-
tached Memorandum," 3 WM. & MARY Q. (3d ser.) 534, 555-62 (1946)).
44. 397 U.S. at 676-78. The Court acknowledged that pervasive state prac-
tice would not necessitate a finding of constitutionality.
It is obviously correct that no one acquires a vested or protected
right in violation of the Constitution by long use, even when that span
of time covers our entire national existence and indeed predates it.
Yet an unbroken practice of according the exemption to churches,
openly and by affirmative state action, not covertly or by state inaction,
is not something to be lightly cast aside.
Id. at 678.
45. Brief Amicus Curiae by the National Council of Churches of Christ in
the United States of America at 4, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). Al-
though the argument was based on the free exercise clause, the brief con-
cluded with a short disclaimer. "Note: This brief's discussion of the Free
Exercise Clause is not intended as disagreement with or disparagement of the
discussion in other defense briefs of the Establishment Clause." Id. at 18.
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ligion, having the same effect as that tax upon the itinerate evangelist
which the Court found unconstitutional in Murdock Iv. Penn-
sylvania].4 6
The progenitor of the theory that the free exercise clause
requires tax exemptions for church properties appears to be
Dean Kelley, director of the Protestant National Council's de-
partment of religious liberty. The crux of the claim, set forth
somewhat simplistically in Kelley's book, Why Churches Should
Not Pay Taxes, is that the power to tax is the power to de-
stroy.47 Because the free exercise clause forbids the govern-
ment to destroy churches, the argument continues, it similarly
forbids government to tax churches or their property, at least
that part used for worship and prayer.
Because the Court determined that the exemption did not
violate the establishment clause, there was no need to decide
whether the free exercise clause would require a finding of con-
stitutionality even if the establishment clause were violated.
Discretion being the better part of valor, the Court wisely re-
frained from indicating which way it would decide should there
come a time when the Court could no longer avoid the trouble-
some question. Notwithstanding the present universality of tax
exemption for church properties, that time may come sooner
than most would expect. Today, more and more middle-income
Americans are moving to the suburbs, where large estates are
often purchased and converted to churches. Although the
property is then removed from the tax rolls, the community
must continue to provide costly services. Since, in the suburbs,
real estate taxes are the major source of local finances, the in-
creased burden on the homeowner can be significant. The dis-
content with this system is manifested not only by an
increasing feeling among suburban homeowners that churches
should pay property taxes,48 but also by the refusal of some
46. Brief Amici Curiae of the Synagogue Council of America and its Con-
stituents at 11, Walz v. Tax Comm'n, 397 U.S. 664 (1970). In Murdock, the Court
held unconstitutional a state license tax on peddlers of devotional literature,
stating that "[t] he power to tax the exercise of a privilege is the power to con-
trol or suppress its enjoyment." Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 112
(1943).
47. "If the threat of loss of tax exemption can be used as a club to keep
churches 'in line,' it will work in the same direction as establishment... , ben-
efitting the churches which are... 'loyal,' while penalizing those that are...
'uncooperative'...." D. KELLEY, WHY CHURCHES SHouLD NOT PAY TAXES 131
(1977).
48. In 1968, the Columbia Broadcasting System conducted an interview
with three groups described as "the Public, the Congress, and the Clergy."
When asked whether sanctuaries should be subject to property tax, 60% of the
public, 89% of the Congress, and 79% of the clergy responded negatively. How-
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town authorities to issue zoning permits for the establishment
or expansion of churches.4 9
Although it is a risky business to predict what the Court
will do in any particular case, it seems likely that at least a ma-
jority of the Court would uphold the constitutionality of elimi-
nating the exemption for church property, even that part used
exclusively for religious purposes. When this happens, the
Court will assuredly not conclude that free exercise is
subordinate to the prohibition against establishment, but only
that the former does not mandate exemption.
B. AID TO PAROCHIAL SCHOOLS
The current status of constitutional law respecting govern-
ment support of church-related educational institutions may be
summarized as follows: there is no constitutional barrier to the
supply of health, nutritional, and similar noneducational serv-
ices;50 although it is permissible to finance transportation 5' and
to loan secular textbooks52 at the elementary and secondary
school levels, any other governmental supply of educational
services would probably not be allowed; 3 and the scope of per-
missible governmental financing is broader at the college or
university level but is by no means as well defined as that at
the lower levels.54
Advocates of more substantial aid to parochial schools
have frequently argued that such aid is not only constitution-
ever, when asked "whether churches should make at least partial contributions
to ease the burdens of property owners who, under present conditions must
pay the entire cost of community services," the response was in the affirmative:
"the public by 59%; Congress by 63%; and the clergy by 62%." M. LARsON & C.
LOwELL, THE RELIGIous EMPIRE: THE GROWTH AND DANGER OF TAx-EXEMPT
PROPERTY IN THE UNITED STATES 249-50 (1976).
49. See, e.g., Corporation of Presiding Bishop of Church of Jesus Christ of
Latter-Day Saints v. City of Portervile, 90 Cal. App. 2d 656, 203 P.2d 823 (1949),
cert. dismissed, 388 U.S. 805 (1950) (municipality may refuse to grant construc-
tion permit for church in an area zoned as residential).
50. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1947).
51. See id. at 16-17.
52. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968).
53. See, e.g., Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 15-16 (1947). See also
Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736, 747 (1976); Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 779-80, 783-85 (1973); Levitt v.
Committee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty, 413 U.S. 472, 481-82 (1973);
Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 621-22 (1971). But cf. Committee for Pub.
Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Regan, 48 U.S.L.W. 4168 (1980) (upholding New
York statute involving reimbursement to nonpublic schools for reporting at-
tendance and grading state-prepared tests).
54. See, e.g., Roemer v. Board of Pub. Works, 426 U.S. 736 (1976); Hunt v.
McNair, 413 U.S. 734 (1973); Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672 (1971).
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ally permissible, but that it is constitutionally required.55 That
argument is based on the fact that a state law requiring attend-
ance at public schools would violate the free exercise clause.56
There are many parents and children, the argument contin-
ues, whose religious conscience forbids public school attend-
ance and requires that the children receive their secular as
well as their religious education in parochial schools. Because
state compulsory school attendance laws are applicable to all
children, the argument concludes, the free exercise clause re-
quires states to make attendance at parochial schools possible
by financing those schools so that the children of low-income
parents can attend.
So formulated, the argument seems to present an unavoid-
able clash between the religion clauses. By barring aid to paro-
chial schools and thereby precluding parochial school
attendance by children of low-income families, the Supreme
Court apparently decides in favor of nonestablishment and
against free exercise.
The clash, however, is more apparent than real. The con-
flict is not between mandated governmental support of paro-
chial schools and forbidden support, but rather between
nonsupport and compulsory attendance. A true conflict of com-
peting constitutional values would exist if the Constitution for-
bade the teaching of religion in public schools yet mandated
attendance exclusively in those schools, even by students
whose religious conscience requires that all instruction, includ-
ing that generally designated as secular, be impregnated with
religion. Because government support is constitutionally for-
bidden and compulsory attendance is purely statutory,57 how-
ever, there is no true clash of competing constitutional values.
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,5 8 the Supreme Court held that
55. Proponents... argue that so long as children are permitted to at-
tend religious schools in fulfillment of the compulsory state attendance
laws, the children have a right to all the benefits and services that are
given to public school children. Otherwise, the children who attend
non-public schools will be discriminated against because they exercise
their rights of religious freedom guaranteed to them by the federal and
state constitutions.
R. Burrs, supra note 2, at 147.
56. "[A] state law interfering with a parent's right to have his child edu-
cated in a sectarian school would run afoul of the Free Exercise Clause." Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 788 (1973).
See text accompanying note 40 supra.
57. The Supreme Court has held that the states are under no constitu-
tional obligation to provide free public education. See San Antonio Independ-
ent School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 (1973).
58. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
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Amish parents have a constitutional right under the free exer-
cise clause not to send their children to school, even a church-
related school, after they complete their elementary school ed-
ucation. The Court concluded that the constitutional mandate
of free exercise is superior to the statutory obligation to send
children to secondary schools5 9 Logically, the same argument
can be made with respect to compulsory attendance at elemen-
tary schools. In either case, the conflict is not between nones-
tablishment and free exercise, but rather exclusively within the
area of free exercise. Resolution of that conflict might require
the Court to hold that compulsory school attendance laws are
unconstitutional even at the elementary school level, but it
would in no way require state support of parochial schools.
By the same reasoning, the constitutional barrier against
religious teachings and practices in public schools does not
present a conflict with the free exercise claim of those whose
religious conscience impels them to pray in school. Rather, the
conflict is between the constitutional mandate against prayer in
public schools 60 and the statutory mandate of school attend-
ance. In other words, parents may have a first amendment
right not to send their children to public schools in which
prayer is forbidden, but they do not have a right to have prayer
in those schools.
C. SABBATARIAN EXEMPTIONS
In the companion cases of Braunfeld v. Brown61 and Gal-
lagher v. Crown Kosher Super Market,62 the Supreme Court
upheld the constitutionality of compulsory Sunday closing laws
even when enforced against persons whose religious convic-
59. The Court held that the statute, to be valid, would have to survive strict
scrutiny under the first amendment-
We turn ... to the State's ... contention that its interest in its
system of compulsory education is so compelling that even the estab-
lished religious practices of the Amish must give way. Where funda-
mental claims of religious freedom are at stake, however, we cannot
accept such a sweeping claim; despite its admitted validity in the gen-
erality of cases, we must searchingly examine the interests that the
State seeks to promote by its requirement for compulsory education to
age 16, and the impediment to those objectives that would flow from
recognizing the claimed Amish exemption.
Id. at 221. The Court subsequently concluded that the statute did not survive
this searching examination "The record strongly indicates that accommodat-
ing the religious objections of the Aniish [will not] materially detract from the
welfare of society." Id. at 234.
60. See, e.g., Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421, 424 (1962).
61. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
62. 366 U.S. 617 (1961).
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tions impelled them to observe a day other than Sunday as
their holy day of rest. In Sherbert v. Verner,63 decided two
years later, the Court held that it was a violation of the free ex-
ercise clause to deny unemployment compensation to a Sev-
enth-Day Adventist who would not accept an available position
that would require her to work on Saturdays.
In the Civil Rights Act of 1964,64 Congress made it an un-
lawful employment practice to discriminate against any person
on the basis of religion.65 Three years later, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, which had the responsibility of
enforcing the law, issued a regulation that imposed "an obliga-
tion on the part of the employer to make reasonable accommo-
dations to the religious needs of employees and prospective
employees where such accommodations can be made without
undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business."66
After five years of experience with this regulation, Congress
was persuaded that the exemption for undue hardship was
workable and, by amendment, wrote it into the Act itself.67
The Supreme Court has been called upon to decide the
constitutionality of the accommodation requirement three
times in the past ten years.68 In all three cases, the Court was
unwilling or unable to decide the issue. In the first two cases,
the eight members of the Court who heard the case split evenly
on how it should be decided. 69 In such instances the decision
of the lower court is deemed affirmed,7 0 but the Supreme Court
does not issue an opinion, and its disposition does not consti-
63. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
64. Act of July 2, 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified in scattered
sections of 42 U.S.C. (1976)).
65. It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or
otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because
of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin ....
42 U.S.C. § 200Oe-2(a) (1) (1976).
66. See 32 Fed. Reg. 10,298 (1967) (codified in 29 C.F.R. § 1605.1(b) (1979)).
67. "The term 'religion' includes all aspects of religious observance and
practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable
to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's reli-
gious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the em-
ployer's business." Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-
261, § 2(7), 86 Stat. 103 (codified in 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(j) (1976)).
68. See TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins,
429 U.S. 65 (1976); Dewey v. Reynolds Metal Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
69. See Parker Seal Co. v. Cummins, 429 U.S. 65 (1976); Dewey v. Reynolds
Metal Co., 402 U.S. 689 (1971).
70. See, e.g., Rice v. Sioux City Memorial Park Cemetery, Inc., 349 U.S. 70
(1954); United Gas Pub. Serv. Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123 (1938).
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tute a precedent that must be followed by lower courts or by
the Supreme Court itself should the question arise again.71 Un-
burdened by precedent, the Court had a free hand to decide
the issue in TWA v. Hardison.7
2
In TWA, both the employer and the labor union argued that
the 1967 regulation and the 1972 amendment violated the estab-
lishment clause. They contended, first, that both the purpose
and the primary effect of the provision were to aid religion, and
second, that enforcement would require excessive governmen-
tal entanglement with religion because "those enforcing the re-
quirement will necessarily weigh and determine whether an
individual has a religious belief, whether it is sincerely held
and how that belief is manifested in the employment relation-
ship."73
No one, however, has found a means of compelling the
Court to decide a constitutional question that it does not want
to decide. In TWA, the Court, over the dissents of Justices
Brennan and Marshall, held that there was no need to decide
the constitutional question since the case could be decided on
purely statutory grounds. Under the facts of the case, TWA
would suffer "undue hardship" if it were required to accommo-
date the employee's religious needs by retaining him in em-
ployment but exempting him from the Saturday work
requirement.
The validity of the establishment claim was challenged in
several amicus curiae briefs,74 but those briefs also argued that
the exemption could be constitutionally justified under the free
exercise clause.75 Applied to governmental employment, the
argument goes something like this: the Supreme Court upheld
71. If the [Supreme Court] judges are divided, the reversal cannot be
had, for no order can be made. The judgment of the court below, there-
fore, stands in full force. It is, indeed, the settled practice in such case
to enter a judgment of affirmance; but this is only the most convenient
mode of expressing the fact that the cause is finally disposed of in con-
formity with the action of the court below, and that court can proceed
to enforce its judgment. The legal effect would be the same if the ap-
peal ... were dismissed.
Durant v. Essex Co., 7 Wall. 107, 112 (1869), quoted in Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S.
188, 192 (1972).
72. 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
73. Brief for Petitioner at 42, TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977).
74. See, e.g., Brief of Amicus Curiae State of Michigan at 20-25, TWA v. Har-
dison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977); Brief for the National Jewish Commission on Law and
Public Affairs ("Colpa") as Amicus Curiae at 10-12, TWA v. Hardison, 432 U.S.
63 (1977).
75. [The Civil Rights Act] gives a Sabbatarian rights that compensate
for the disability he suffers by not belonging to the majority faith....
[T]o give a minority employee the equal treatment to which he is enti-
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the Civil Rights Act of 1964 as a valid exercise of the govern-
ment's constitutional power to regulate commerce, a power ex-
panded by the Constitution's authorization of laws "necessary
and proper" for executing all powers vested in the government
by the Constitution.76 Because discrimination against Sab-
batarians, like discrimination against blacks, impedes inter-
state commerce, Congress could constitutionally legislate
against it.v7
The Constitution, however, includes not only the commerce
and establishment clauses but also the free exercise clause.
Hence, there could be little doubt that under the power to en-
act laws "necessary and proper" to ensure free exercise, Con-
gress could forbid governmental discrimination against
Sabbatarians. Congress, furthermore, need not stop at prohib-
iting discrimination by federal or state governments. It could
conclude that full compliance with the free exercise clause
could be accomplished only if the prohibition against discrimi-
nation also applied to private business, especially large corpo-
rations that often employ more persons than small
communities do.
Congress has been urged to amend the statute to provide
explicitly that the resulting added cost to large corporations
cannot be deemed an "undue hardship" because the corpora-
tions can easily pass on such costs to the general public. As-
suming that this would constitute a violation of the
establishment clause, however, it would seem that the Court
would then be faced with the necessity of weighing that clause
against the free exercise clause, and deciding between them. It
is safe to predict, however, that if faced with this choice, the
Court would once again find a way to avoid reaching a decision.
D. ABORTION FOR THE ECONOMICALLY DISADVANTAGED
Two years before its historic decision in Roe v. Wade,78
which invalidated laws that made abortion criminal, the
Supreme Court upheld a District of Columbia criminal abortion
tied in fairness and justice (and, we believe, in the implementation of
"free exercise values"), a law such as [this] is a necessity.
Brief for the National Jewish Commission on Law and Public Affairs ("Colpa")
as Amicus Curiae, supra note 74, at 18-19 (footnote omitted). See Brief of Ami-
cus Curiae State of Michigan, supra note 74, at 21-23.
76. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18.
77. In such case, of course, there would be a conflict between the com-
merce clause and the establishment clause. Consideration of that conflict, how-
ever, is beyond the scope of this Article.
78. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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statute in United States v. Vuitch.79 In a dissenting opinion,
Justice Douglas quoted from an article by former Supreme
Court Justice Tom Clarlk
Throughout history religious belief has wielded a vital influence on so-
ciety's attitude regarding abortion. The religious issues involved are
perhaps the most frequently debated aspects of abortion. At the center
of the ecclesiastical debate is the concept of "ensoulment" or 'person-
hood," i.e., the time at which the fetus becomes a human organism.
The Reverend Joseph F. Donseel of Fordham University admitted that
no one can determine with certainty the exact moment at which "en-
soulment" occurs, but we must deal with the moral problems of abort-
ing a fetus even if it has not taken place. Many Roman Catholics
believe that the soul is a gift of God given at conception. This leads to
the conclusion that aborting a pregnancy at any time amounts to the
taking of a human life and is therefore against the will of God. Others,
including some Catholics, believe that abortion should be legal until
the baby is viable, i.e., able to support itself outside the womb. In bal-
ancing the evils, the latter conclude that the evil of destroying the fetus
is outweighed by the social evils accompanying forced pregnancy and
childbirth. 80
In Roe v. Wade, the Court carefully avoided both the non-
establishment and free exercise mandates of the first amend-
ment. The Court ruled instead that a fetus is not a person and
that the fifth and fourteenth amendments, which forbid govern-
ment to deprive any person of life without due process of law,
therefore do not protect the unborn.8 ' This, of course, indicates
only that no one has the right to come into court to assert the
claimed rights of the fetus. It does not mean that a legislature
may not forbid destruction of the fetus. On this point, however,
the Court held that within the Constitution's concept of per-
sonal liberty there exists "a right of personal privacy."8 2 "This
right of privacy," the Court continued, "is broad enough to en-
compass a woman's decision whether or not to terminate her
pregnancy. '"83
In 1977 the Court, to the surprise of many, upheld both the
constitutionality of a federal law precluding medicaid and
medicare payments for nontherapeutic abortions,84 and the
constitutionality of an order by the mayor of St. Louis forbid-
ding abortions in municipal hospitals.85 In upholding the St.
Louis order, the Court acknowledged that the doctors and med-
ical students serving in the hospital's obstetrics-gynecology
79. 402 U.S. 62 (1971).
80. Id. at 79 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting) (quoting Clark, Religion, Morality,
and Abortion: A Constitutional Appraisal, 2 Loy. L.A. L. REv. 1, 4 (1969)).
81., 410 U.S. 113, 157-58 (1973).
82. Id. at 152-55.
83. Id. at 153.
84. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977); Beal v. Doe, 432 U.S. 438 (1977).
85. Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
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clinic were drawn from the faculty and students at the St.
Louis University School of Medicine, a Jesuit-operated institu-
tion opposed to abortions. 86 The Court, however, pointed out
that as an elected official, the mayor was responsible to the
people of the city, who could manifest their disapproval at the
polls. 87 The Court did not address the issue of whether the
mayor's action violated the first amendment's guarantee of
church-state separation, a question raised and argued in an
amicus curiae brief submitted on behalf of a number of Protes-
tant and Jewish organizations affiliated with the Religious Coa-
lition for Abortion Rights. 88
The first amendment issue is squarely presented to the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of New
York in the pending case of McRae v. Califano.89 That action
directly challenges as a violation of the establishment clause
denial of payments for elective abortion procedures under fed-
eral, state, and local medicare and medicaid programs. The
counter contention (in addition, of course, to a denial that the
challenged laws and practices violate the establishment clause)
is that although the Constitution, as interpreted by the
Supreme Court, ensures the right to abortion, it would violate
the free exercise clause to compel Catholics and others whose
religious convictions condemn abortions to finance nonthera-
peutic abortions through their taxes.9 0
This case appears to present an unavoidable confrontation
between the nonestablishment and the free exercise guaran-
tees. Nevertheless, it is a safe guess that however the Supreme
Court resolves the issue, it will avoid deciding that the two first
amendment guarantees are in conflict, that one is subordinate
to the other, and that the subordinate one therefore must yield.
86. Id. at 520.
87. Id. at 521.
88. See Brief of American Jewish Congress, Board of Church and Society
of the United Methodist Church, National Women's Conference of the Ameri-
can Ethical Union, New York State Council of Churches, Union of American
Hebrew Congregations and Unitarian Universalist Women's Federation, Amici
Curiae at 11-18, Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519 (1977).
89. McRae v. Mathews, 421 F. Supp. 533 (1976), vacated and remanded on
appeal sub nom. Califano v. McRae, 433 U.S. 916 (1977).
90. The Supreme Court has held that taxpayers have standing to challenge
laws that allegedly violate the establishment clause. See, e.g., Flast v. Cohen,
392 U.S. 83 (1968). Therefore, there would seem to be no standing problem-the
statute is challenged not by persons claiming to represent the rights of the un-
born, but rather by taxpayers representing only themselves and other taxpay-
ers.
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E. RELIGIOUS TESTS FOR PUBLIC OFFICE
The latest Supreme Court case presenting a confrontation
between the establishment and free exercise barriers, McDan-
iel v. Paty,9 ' involved a state provision barring clergy from pub-
lic office. As noted earlier, by the time of the adoption of the
Constitution, a majority of the states had enacted such provi-
sions92 with the purpose of prohibiting an establishment of reli-
gion.93 By 1978, however, only one of these provisions
remained in effect. The Tennessee provision that prohibited
clergy from holding political office 94 was the basis of a suit by a
defeated candidate in a state election for delegates to a conven-
tion to revise the state constitution. The defeated candidate ar-
gued that the elected candidate was disqualified because he
was an ordained minister. The Tennessee Supreme Court de-
cided in favor of the defeated candidate, Paty,95 and the elected
candidate, McDaniel, appealed to the United States Supreme
Court. Although the eight participating Justices agreed that
the Tennessee provision violated the Constitution, they could
agree on little else.
The crux of Chief Justice Burger's plurality opinion was
that, under the Court's decision in Wisconsin v. Yoder,9 6 "only
those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise
served can overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of
religion." 97 Chief Justice Burger noted that, in McDaniel, the
only overbalancing interest asserted by the state and accepted
by the Tennessee court was the prevention of the establish-
ment of a state religion, an interest of the highest order.98 The
Chief Justice argued, however, that whatever may have been
the situation in the eighteenth century, there is currently no
persuasive support for the fear that clergymen elected to public
91. 435 U.S. 618 (1978).
92. See text accompanying note 4 supra.
93. One of the most obvious characteristics of church-state union is the ex-
ercise of political power by the clergy, a fact evidenced by the history of colo-
nial Massachusetts. See W. SWEET, supra note 2, at 87-89.
94. Whereas ministers of the gospel are, by their profession, dedicated
to God and the care of Souls, and ought not to be diverted from the
great duties of their functions; therefore, no ministers of the gospel, or
priest of any denomination whatever, shall be eligible to a seat in ei-
ther House of the legislature.
TENN. CONST. of 1796, art. VIII, § 1, quoted in McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 621
n.1 (1978).
95. Paty v. McDaniel, 547 S.W.2d 897, 910 (Tenn. 1977).
96. 406 U.S. 205 (1972). See text accompanying notes 58-59 supra.
97. McDaniel v. Paty, 435 U.S. 618, 628 (1978) (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder,
406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972)).
98. 435 U.S. 618, 626 (1978).
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office will be less careful of antiestablishment interests or less
faithful to their oaths of civil office than their unordained coun-
terparts. 99 Absent such support, he concluded, the provision
barring clergy from public office cannot withstand challenge
under the free exercise clause, since that clause "unquestiona-
bly encompasses the right to preach, proselyte, and ... to be a
minister." 00
Justice Brennan, with the concurrence of Justice Marshall,
also found no conflict in the case between the free exercise and
establishment clauses. Rather, Brennan concluded that the
challenged statute was invalid under both clauses. With re-
spect to the latter, he stated that the Tennessee provision
"manifests patent hostility toward, not nonneutrality in respect
of, religion, forces or influences a minister or priest to abandon
his ministry as the price of public office, and in sum, has a pri-
mary effect which inhibits religion."'' 1
Justice Stewart, in a concurring opinion, argued that the
matter was settled by Torcaso v. Watkins,l0 2 a case in which
the Court invalidated a state law requiring public officials to
take an oath that they believed in God. He noted, however,
that the offense against the first amendment "lay not simply in
requiring an oath,"'1 3 (free exercise aspect) "but in 'limiting
public offices to persons who have, or perhaps more properly
profess to have, a belief in some particular kind of religious
concept' "104 (establishment aspect).
In his concurring opinion, Justice White argued against any
invocation of the first amendment. 05 In previous opinions, he
had indicated strong disagreement with the theory that the es-
tablishment clause banned aid to parochial schools. 0 6 Simi-
larly, Justice White argued in McDaniel that the free exercise
99. See id.
100. Id.
101. 435 U.S. at 636 (Brennan, J., concurring).
102. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
103. 435 U.S. at 642 (Stewart, J., concurring).
104. Id. (quoting Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488, 494 (1961)).
105. 435 U.S. at 643-46 (White, J., concurring).
106. In Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), Justice White stated in a
concurring opinion, "It is enough for me that States and the Federal Govern-
ment are financing a separable secular function of overriding importance in or-
der to sustain the legislation here challenged. That religion and private
interests other than education. may substantially benefit does not convert these
laws into impermissible establishments of religion." Id. at 664. See also Com-
mittee for Pub. Educ. & Religious Liberty v. Nyquist, 413 U.S. 756, 813-24 (1973)
(White, J., dissenting).
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clause did not invalidate the provision barring clergy from pub-
lic office. He was not convinced that McDaniel would be de-
terred from the observance of his religious beliefs, since he was
not compelled to abandon the ministry as a result of the chal-
lenged statute nor required to disavow any of his religious be-
liefs. Rather, Justice White concluded, he had been denied the
equal protection of the laws and the provision should therefore
have been invalidated on that ground, and that ground alone.107
For the purposes of this Article, it is not what the Justices
held, nor on what ground they invalidated the statute that is
most relevant. Rather, the most significant aspect of the Mc-
Daniel case is what the Court did not say. As has been noted,
the Chief Justice previously intimated that if the Court were
faced with a factual situation requiring it to decide one way
under the free exercise clause and the opposite way under the
establishment clause, it would rank free exercise over estab-
lishment and would decide the case accordingly. 108 As has also
been noted, the Court has never found it necessary to make the
choice; the Justices have always been able to find under the
particular facts of each case that a decision could be reached
without sacrificing one clause to preserve the other.
Precisely the same thing happened in McDaniel v. Paty.
Although basing their conclusions on different reasoning, all
the Justices agreed that the Tennessee provision was unconsti-
tutional. Furthermore, none of the Justices concluded that
eliminating the provision-thereby permitting clergy to hold
public office-violated the establishment clause. There was,
therefore, no need for any of the Justices to indicate how they
would have decided the case if it had presented an unavoidable
collision between free exercise and nonestablishment.
IV. CONCLUSION
The conclusion reached from an examination of these cases
is that although the Supreme Court has stated that there may
be instances in which the establishment and free exercise
clauses conflict with each other, the Court will continue to find
ways to decide such cases without definitely adjudicating
which clause is superior and which subordinate, or which must
be preserved and which sacrificed. The de facto consequence is
that, notwithstanding contrary assertions by scholars and
107. 435 U.S. at 646 (White, J., concurring).
108. See text accompanying note 32 supra.
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Supreme Court Justices, Justice Rutledge was correct in stat-
ing that "establishment" and "free exercise" represent only dif-
ferent facets of a single freedom. 0 9
109. See text accompanying note 10 supra.
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